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Introduction
After years of criticism toward its mode of operation,1 the World Bank is
now engaged in a major and drastic institutional reform aimed at enhanc-
ing its transparency and accountability through access to information. In
July 2010, the World Bank Access to Information Policy (the AI Policy) was
launched as one initiative to provide better access to information for the
public.2 A “landmark disclosure policy”3 for the World Bank, a “welcome
step”,4 or a “clear sign of the development of procedural norms that apply
to global institutions”5 for others, the AI Policy is nonetheless a major re-
form of the Bank's disclosure policy as it represents a “paradigm shift in
the Bank's approach to disclosure”.6 It has indeed redefined the way the
I.
* Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural
Law.
1 See for example the long-standing criticism from the Global Transparency Initia-
tive. B. Jenkins, The World Bank's New Access to Information Policy: Conceptual
Leap with Limits, Bank Information Center – IFI Info Brief, (March 2010), 3 [Jenk-
ins, The World Bank’s New Access to Information Policy].
2 Another initiative is the Open Data Initiative, also launched in 2010, which allows
access to World Bank data, including databases, pre-formatted tables, reports, and
other resources. For more information on the Open Data Initiative, see http://data.
worldbank.org (last visited 6 December 2018).
3 See Website of the World Bank, ‘Access to Information’, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information (last visited 6 December
2018).
4 B. S. Chimni, International Financial Institutions and International Law: A Third
World Perspective, in D. D. Bradlow & D. B. Hunter (eds.), International Financial
Institutions and International Law (2010), 60.
5 M. Macchia, The rule of law and transparency in the global space, in S. Cassese
(ed.), Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law (2016), 271.
6 World Bank, ‘Toward Greater Transparency: Rethinking The World Bank's Disclo-
sure Policy – Approach Paper’, (January 2009), available at http://siteresources.worl
dbank.org/INFODISCLOSURE/Resources/5033530-1236640024078/English_full.p
df (last visited 6 December 2018), 2 [World Bank, Toward Greater Transparency].
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Bank makes information accessible to the public by reversing the logic
adopted for access to information; going from a policy which listed the in-
formation allowed to be made available, to the current approach of mak-
ing available all the information in the Bank's possession as long as it is
not on the list of exceptions.7 It has also established the Access to Informa-
tion Appeals Procedure (the AI Procedure), a quasi-judicial two-stage pro-
cess to hear appeals from decisions denying access to information. After a
closer look at the AI Policy (I), this chapter will focus on the structure (II)
and nature (III) of the AI Procedure. The novelty of this procedure will
then be highlighted in the concluding remarks (IV).
A Closer Look at the AI Policy
The first efforts of the World Bank to enhance access to information began
in 1985 with the adoption of the Directive on Disclosure of Information,
which was the first instruction to staff on information disclosure.8 It estab-
lished a “presumption in favour of disclosure” in the absence of com-
pelling reasons not to disclose. The first formal disclosure policy was
adopted in 19939 where it has since been periodically reviewed and its
scope has progressively expanded. Updates occurred in 2001 and 2005,
with the adoption of proposals to allow access to additional documents.10
The pre-2010 policy was, then, a fairly wide-reaching policy listing all the
categories of information that the Bank could disclose, the so-called “posi-
tive list”.
Motivated by the criticisms mentioned above, but also by “a sense with-
in the Bank that its own protocols fell short of what is urged on client
countries”,11 the Bank began the redrafting, in March 2009, of the policy
with the release of an approach paper acknowledging that “the time has
II.
7 World Bank, ‘Access to Information Staff Handbook’, June 2010, available at https:
//policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0823713bb.pdf (last
visited 6 December 2018) 2.
8 See Website of the World Bank, ‘Access to Information – timeline’, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information/overview#3 (last visited 6
December 2018).
9 World Bank, supra note 6, 1.
10 Ibid.
11 B. Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global
Regulatory Governance, in H. Cissé et al. (eds.), The World Bank Legal Review
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come to take a fresh look at the Bank's disclosure policy framework”.12 The
approach paper highlighted various policy limitations such as, for exam-
ple, the fact that a presumption against the disclosure of information was
involuntarily created for documents not listed in the positive list, or that
there was a lack of clarity on what is not to be disclosed.13
Several rounds of consultations with stakeholders then took place in 33
countries over three months in 2009; a consultation process that was ad-
mittedly “more extensive than what is typically seen at the World Bank”.14
During the consultation meeting of April 2009 in Washington D.C, several
participants urged the Bank to recognise the right of access to information
as a fundamental human right.15 Bank officials ultimately declined, but af-
firmed that they understood the Bank is a “public body”16 and as such it
must have a compelling reason not to disclose information.
A revised draft of the disclosure policy was then released publicly by the
Bank in October 2009, taking into account the results of the several rounds
of consultation.17 The final version of the draft was adopted by the board
of executive directors in November 2009.18 It is based on five guiding prin-
ciples which require the Bank to maximize access to information, set out a
clear list of exceptions, safeguard the deliberative process, provide clear
procedures for making information available and, to recognize the re-
questers' right to an appeals process.19
12 World Bank, supra note 6, 2. This paper was the result of an approach discussed in
December 2008 during a meeting between two Committees of the World Bank,
the Committee on Development Effectiveness and the Committee on Governance
and Executive Directors' Administrative Matters. See World Bank, Toward Greater
Transparency – Rethinking the Bank's Disclosure Policy (December 2008).
13 Ibid.
14 D. B. Hunter, International Law and Public Participation in Policy-Making at the
International Financial Institutions, in D. D. Bradlow & D. B. Hunter (eds.), In-
ternational Financial Institutions and International Law (2010), 223.
15 World Bank, Toward Greater Transparency: Rethinking The World Bank's Disclo-
sure Policy – Summary of the Consultation Meeting, (April 2009), 1 [World Bank,
Summary of Consultation Meeting 2009].
16 Ibid., 3.
17 World Bank, Toward Greater Transparency Through Access to Information – The
World Bank's Disclosure Policy (Revised Draft) (October 2009), 1 [World Bank,
Toward Greater Transparency – Revised Draft].
18 The AI Policy was, since then, revised on two occasions to refine its scope and to
improve access to Bank information.
19 World Bank, ‘Policy on Access to Information’ (July 2015), available at http://pub
docs.worldbank.org/en/393051435850102801/World-Bank-Policy-on-Access-to-Inf
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The AI Policy explicitly set out a list of the ten groups of documents
which are considered to be exceptions.20 They concern the personal infor-
mation of staff members (e.g. medical information, selection processes...);
communications of governors and/or executive directors' offices; proceed-
ings of the ethics committee for board officials; information subject to at-
torney-client privilege; security and safety information; information re-
stricted under rules of other Bank entities; confidential member country
and third-party information; corporate administrative matters (e.g. corpo-
rate expenses, real estate procurement...); deliberative information (e.g. of-
ficial e-mails relating to Bank business...); and financial information (e.g.
estimates of future borrowing, donor information...). These exceptions
have been voluntarily drawn narrowly so as to protect legitimate and well-
defined interests from potential harm.21 The AI Policy, however, allows for
a “public interest override” by which management may decide to disclose
restricted information “if it determines that the overall benefits of such dis-
closure outweigh the potential harm to”22 protected interests. Similarly,
the World Bank would reserve the right not to disclose, under exceptional
circumstances, information that it would normally disclose, if it deter-
mines that such disclosure is likely to “cause harm that outweighs the
benefits of disclosure”.23
The Structure of the AI Procedure: a Two-Stage Appeals Process
Unlike previous disclosure policies of the World Bank, the AI Policy pro-
vides for a procedure allowing requesters who are denied access to infor-
mation by the Bank to file for an appeal. The idea to include such mecha-
nism in the new AI Policy came from the Bank who recognized in the
2009 approach paper that the lack of an appeals process was one of the lim-
III.
ormation-V2.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018), Section III, A. 1., 9 [World Bank,
Policy on Access to Information].
20 Ibid., Section III, B. 2. 9.
21 It has been noted, however, that “several of the 10 listed exceptions are so broadly
drafted that they may lead to the withholding of large volumes of uncontroversial
information”. Jenkins, The World Bank’s New Access to Information Policy, supra
note 1, 9.
22 World Bank, supra note 19, Section IV, 1., 19.
23 Ibid., Section IV, 2., 20.
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itations of previous policies.24 The Bank stressed the need for a “disclosure
policy-specific administrative appeals mechanism for those who wish to
appeal disclosure decisions”.25
The initial idea was however to create a single-stage five-member appeal
panel headed by Bank senior management officials.26 The Bank also sug-
gested that outside parties could be included, taking as an example the
composition of its Sanctions Board.27 Since 2004, the Sanctions Board has
been composed of seven members, three internal and four external mem-
bers. Additionally, since 2009, the chair of the Sanctions Board must be se-
lected from its external members.28 Originally, the Sanctions Board was
composed entirely of members from the World Bank.29 This choice was
justified at that time by the fact that members of the Bank were those who,
on the basis of their knowledge and experience, were able to assess
whether it was in the interests of the World Bank to continue to work with
a company or an individual about whom there existed concerns of corrup-
tion or fraud. The modification of the Sanctions Board to include outside
parties was based on the recommendations of the Thornburgh Report, an
external panel in charge of reviewing the World Bank sanctions process.30
Invoking the “progressive solidification of the Bank's resolve to develop
and demonstrate procedure in all of its operation that exemplify its com-
mitment to fairness and due process”,31 the panel suggested to change the
composition to one of a mixed type with members both from the Bank
and from outside of it. It is then most probably from this experience, and
ultimately to prevent possible conflicts of interest and ensure that the so-
24 “The Bank does not have a clear mechanism to receive and respond to appeals
about information to which access has been denied. The policy does not provide
any guidance on whether there is a place/person within the Bank's management
hierarchy to which requesters can appeal the initial disclosure decision if they feel





28 For more details, see L. Boisson de Chazournes & E. Fromageau, Balancing the
Scales: The World Bank Sanctions Process and Access to Remedies, 23(4) The
European Journal of International Law (2012), 977-979.
29 Ibid., 977. In 2016, the World Bank started a transition to an all-external Sanction
Board membership.
30 D. Thornburgh et al., ‘Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of the World
Bank’ (2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/
thornburghreport.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018), 1.
31 Ibid., 21.
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called appeals panel acts in an independent and impartial manner, that the
Bank suggested the possibility to include outside parties.
The proposal to create such an appeals panel was welcomed by stake-
holders during the consultation rounds in 2009. Some stakeholders even
saw such proposal as placing the Bank “at the cutting-edge of international
financial institutions”.32 Several concerns were highlighted during these
rounds. It was important that the panel respond promptly to an appeal,
ideally within 30 days.33 The question of the composition of the appeals
panel was also a concern.34 The NGO Global Transparency Initiative (GTI)
openly criticised the approach adopted by the Bank, noting that:
[Such body] falls short of [...] the call in the GTI Charter for a truly
independent appeals mechanism. Why would this body be chaired by
a Managing Director or include Regional Vice Presidents, as this
would likely raise potential conflicts of interest? We call for the cre-
ation of an appeals body independent from operational management.
At a minimum, we support the idea of including outside parties on the
panel.35
The position of Bank officials during this round was to ensure that the pro-
posed panel would include external parties to guarantee that “its decisions
are independent of the Bank's management”.36
The appeals process established by the AI Policy is, however, quite differ-
ent. The first stage of the appeal process37 is conducted by the Access to
Information Committee (AI Committee), a nine-member internal “admin-
32 World Bank, supra note 15, 2.
33 Ibid.
34 See, for example, E. Hanson, ‘Ghana: Concerns Raised Over World Bank's New
Disclosure Policy’, TWN Africa Blog (June 2009), available at http://apps.twnafrica
.org/Blog/?e=30336&d=06/05/2009&s=Ghana%3A Concerns Raised Over World
Bank%27s New Disclosure Policy (last visited 6 December 2018).
35 B. Jenkins, “Brief Comments on World Bank ‘Approach Paper’”, GTI World Bank
Transparency Review Update 3, (April 2009) 4.
36 World Bank, supra note 15, 4.
37 The AI Committee is also in charge of reporting to Bank management and advis-
ing management on the application of the AI Policy to complex issues, reviewing
proposals to disclose information that is on the list of exceptions, establishing ser-
vice fees and service standards, and issuing guidelines to staff on policy imple-
mentation. World Bank, supra note 15, Section III, 7. 19.
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istrative body”38 composed fully of Bank staff members.39 Outside parties
are to be found at the second stage of the process, in an “independent”40
Appeals Board (AI Appeals Board) of three outside experts.41
This configuration was proposed to the Board of Executive Directors in
the revised draft of the policy released by the Bank in October 2009, a doc-
ument made available to the public after the several rounds of consulta-
tions.42 It was during these rounds that the idea of creating a two-stage ap-
peals process was introduced. It was first suggested to the Bank to confer
the “additional function of providing expedited, independent reviews of
refusals to disclose information”43 to the World Bank Inspection Panel.44
The Bank declined and instead created a second-stage body of similar func-
tion to the Inspection Panel, also being composed of three independent ex-
ternal members.45
Another difference between the model suggested during the consulta-
tion rounds and the model adopted by the Bank concerns the jurisdiction
of the second-stage body. The AI policy has indeed set out two distinct
grounds for appeal: 1) if the requester establishes a prima facie case that the
Bank has failed to disclose information which is not restricted and 2) if the
38 Ibid., Section III, 7. 18.
39 It consists of principal members and their alternates, representing the Operations
Policy and Country Services (OPCS), External Affairs (EXT), Legal (LEG), Corpo-
rate Secretary Vice Presidency (SEC), General Services Department (GSD), Infor-
mation Management and Technology (IMT) and one region.
40 World Bank, supra note 15, Section III, 8., (b), ii, 19.
41 See World Bank, ‘AI Appeals Board’, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information/ai-appealsboard (last visited
6 December 2018).
42 World Bank, supra note 17, 5: “The Bank recognizes requesters’ right to an ap-
peals process if they believe that the Bank has unreasonably denied access to infor-
mation that should be publicly available under its Disclosure Policy. It would pro-
pose to adopt a two-stage appeals process: an internal panel and an independent
panel. This process would include clear standards for the time for considering ap-
peals”. (emphasis added).
43 GTI, ‘Model World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information’ (2009), available at
http://www.ifitransparency.org/uploads/7f12423bd48c10f788a1abf37ccfae2b/GTI
_WB_Model_Policy_final.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018), 3.
44 It was indeed suggested in the Washington D.C. round to use the World Bank In-
spection Panel as an appeal body, “thereby avoiding the creation and expense of a
new entity”. World Bank, supra note 15, 2.
45 Whereas the members of the Inspection Panel are appointed by the Board of Di-
rectors for a five-year non-renewable term, the members of the AI Appeals Board
are nominated by the President, and endorsed by the Board of Executive Direc-
tors, for a two-year renewable period.
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appellant wishes to make a public interest case for disclosure to override
the exceptions (the above-mentioned public interest override).46 These two
grounds of appeal can be invoked before the AI Committee at the first
stage of the appeal process.47 However, for appeals asserting a public inter-
est override, the decision of the AI Committee is final. Denial of a request
for a public interest override by the AI Committee cannot be brought be-
fore the AI Appeals Board.48 The latter's jurisdiction is then restricted to
denial by the AI Committee on appeals asserting prima facie violations of
the Policy.49
Such limitation of competence is likely motivated by the willingness of
the World Bank to retain control over the information to be released on
grounds of public interest.50 A sign of such motivation can be found in the
revised draft of the Policy released in October 2009, where the Bank's offi-
cials invoked as a justification for the limitation that the “override is only
to be exercised at the discretion of the Bank”.51 Preventing external mem-
bers from assessing public interest cases is clearly a flaw in the procedure.52
An assessment of a public interest case, indeed, calls for the inclusion of
external members in the decision-making, as “internal bodies lack an ob-
jective view”.53
46 World Bank, supra note 17, 15.
47 World Bank, supra note 19, Section III, 8, (b), i., 18.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 A public interest override which is ab initio limited, as it only concerns three of
the ten exceptions (corporate administrative matter, deliberative information and
financial information).
51 World Bank, supra note 17, 16, para. 27.
52 In their comments on the revised draft, GTI “applauds the proposal in the draft
Policy to create an independent appeals mechanism. It would be preferable to set
out in more detail in the policy how the members are to be appointed and how
the body is to function in practice. Furthermore, it should have wider powers, for
example, to decide on public interest disclosures and to make general recommen-
dations for reform or improvement”. GTI, ‘Comments on Toward Greater Trans-
parency Through Access to information: The World Bank's Disclosure Policy: Re-
vised Draft’ (2009) available at http://www.ifitransparency.org/uploads/7f12423bd
48c10f788a1abf37ccfae2b/GTI_comments_WBdisclosure_Nov 09.final.pdf (last
visited 6 December 2018).
53 S. Fujita, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Human Rights – Devel-
oping Standards of Transparency, Participation and Accountability (2013), 132
[Fujita, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Human Rights].
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As of November 2018, the AI Committee rendered 67 decisions on ap-
peal.54 In 43 of those decisions (64 %), the AI Committee upheld the
Bank's initial decision to deny access. 17 other cases (25 %) were dismissed
because of inter alia an appeal on a matter that the AI Committee did not
have authority to consider, or an untimely filing of appeal.55 In only 7 cas-
es (11 %) did the AI Committee reverse the decision of the Bank and allow
access to the documents. 6 of these cases were on the basis of a prima facie
violation, the remaining case was one of public interest. With respect to
the grounds of appeal, a prima facie violation was argued in 18 cases (27 %),
a public interest override was requested in 15 cases (22 %), and in 34 cases
both grounds were invoked (51 %). Meanwhile, 10 decisions were rendered
by the AI Appeals Board,56 upholding the denial of the AI Committee in 6
cases (60 %), reversing it in 3 (30 %) and dismissing the request in 1 case
(10 %).
The only case allowing access to information on public interest grounds
was case no. AI1627.57 Here, the Bank initially denied access to a request
for an unpublished report on the basis that it was covered by one of the ten
exceptions, as part of deliberative information. The applicant challenged
the denial before the AI Committee, stating that the information was be-
ing sought for ongoing empirical research, and that it may have contained
data which was usually hard to find. The AI Committee decided to release
the report as it found the reasons set forth in the application to be com-
pelling.
In two other cases, AI077358 and AI3892,59 the AI Committee decided to
exercise the Bank's prerogative to disclose restricted information. This pre-
54 See World Bank, ‘AIC Decisions on Appeals’, available at http://www.worldbank.o
rg/en/access-to-information/aicdecisions (last visited 21 November 2018).
55 Appeals must be filed within 60 calendar days of the Bank's initial decision to de-
ny access. World Bank, supra note 19, Section III, 8., (b), i., 18.
56 See World Bank, ‘AIAB Decisions on Appeals’, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information/aiabdecisions (last visited 21
November 2018).
57 AI Committee, ‘Cost Recovery Report Regarding Sanitation in India Case no.
AI1627’ (30 May 2012), available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/8299214338
85011761/18-AIC-appeal-18-Case-AI1627.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018).
58 AI Committee, ‘The Imataca Forest Reserve and Environs: Issues in Resource
Planning, Public Participation and Sustainable Management, August 1999, Case
no. AI0773’ (13 July 2011), available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/5579214
33884471821/8-AIC-appeal-8-Case-AI0773.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018) [AI
Committee, Imataca Forest Reserve and Environs].
59 AI Committee, ‘World Bank Group Procedure on Country Engagement, Case no.
AI3892’ (23 February 2016), available at
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rogative allows for documents falling into one of the three exceptions po-
tentially covered by public interest override (i.e. corporate administrative
matter, deliberative information and financial information) to be dis-
closed, under exceptional circumstances, if the Bank determines that the
overall benefits of such disclosure outweigh the potential harm to the
interest(s) protected by the exception(s).60
In both of these cases, the AI Committee was not convinced by the argu-
ments of the appellant to enable a public interest override. Requesting the
release of an unpublished report on a Venezuelan rain forest in case
AI0773, the appellant argued that:
[T]he public interest relates to the nature of this report. The document
comprises of analysis based on information that is not readily available
pertaining to an important biologically diverse environment situated
near a UN designated World Heritage site. There is clear public inter-
est in learning about the World Bank's findings and analyses on South
America's ecologically vulnerable rain forests.61
The appellant in case AI3892 developed a more elaborate argument in
favour of a public interest override. Requesting the release of the World
Bank Group Procedure on Country Engagement, the appellant referred to
decision AI1627 mentioned above and stated that:
[T]here is a public interest case for publishing the Bank's Procedures in
general and the requested Procedure in particular. Procedures, includ-
ing the requested one, are relevant for scientific research on interna-
tional law and global governance.62
However, the AI Committee found no compelling public interest reason to
override the exception in both cases. In case AI3892, the AI Committee ex-
plained its decision by the fact that the request was different than the one
in case AI1627 as “the information requested was of a distinct nature and
of a different subject matter; a knowledge report with data on sanitation
services in India as opposed to a document with internal work processes.”63
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992431463172426839/41-AIC-Decision-Case-Nu
mber-AI3892-A-final-for-website.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018) [AI Commit-
tee, World Bank Group Procedure on Country Engagement].
60 World Bank, supra note 19, Section IV, 1., 19.
61 AI Committee, supra note 58, 1, 2, para. 3.
62 AI Committee, supra note 59, 2, para. 4.
63 Ibid., 5, para. 13.
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The documents were nevertheless disclosed as the test of potential harm
was conclusive in both cases.
The test of potential harm was also applied in other cases, but with dif-
ferent results. In case IA235964, for example, the test of potential harm gave
rise to quite a unique situation in which only a portion of the requested
information was released, specifically the name of the winning bidder and
the contract value.65 Finally, in case IA2732,66 the appellant requested the
release of a document commissioned by the Bank on the impact of hy-
dropower projects on Ganga River asserting that this document “is unsci-
entific and weak and, for this reason, [the Bank needs to release it] so that
the people can get an alternative view of the cumulative impact of these
projects”.67 After consulting with relevant business units, the AI Commit-
tee came to the conclusion that the test of potential harm was inconclu-
sive, and thus did not disclose the document.
This cluster of decisions shows that the AI Committee has adopted a
very restrictive definition of public interest throughout its first eight years.
It is this restrictive definition which has led to only one decision in favour
of a public interest override. Whilst it is true that most of the other deci-
sions on public interest override were turned out based on reasons that
leave little space for the invocation of a public interest,68 another path
could have been taken by the AI Committee for at least the four above-
mentioned cases on the exercise of the Bank's prerogative.
These decisions also show that the AI Committee is carefully analysing
the arguments advanced by the appellants. In cases where the requester
provided no reason in support of the public interest appeal, the AI Com-
64 AI Committee, ‘Certain Corporate Procurement Information Concerning the
Consulting Project (Selection #1061565, “BEEPS v. Turkey”), Case no. AI2359’ (19
June 2013), available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/560351433946961433/2
1-AppealsDecisionCaseNumberAI2359A.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018) [AI
Committee, BEEPS v. Turkey].
65 Ibid., 4, para. 8.
66 AI Committee, ‘Study Done by Mott MacDonald on Cumulative Impacts of Hy-
dropower Projects on Ganga River, Case no. IA2732’, (24 June 2013), available at
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/929061433948885353/25-AIC-appeal-25-Case-AI
2732.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018).
67 Ibid., 2, para. 2.
68 It includes inter alia the fact that the requested document is not existing, or al-
ready public (cases IA0199, IA0495, IA 3157, IA3127), that the document was cov-
ered by an exception that the AI Committee has no authority to override (cases
IA0262, IA0287, IA2605, IA4191), or that access was already granted on the basis
of a violation prima facie of the policy (cases IA1437, IA4148).
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mittee simply dismissed the public interest portion of the appeal.69 In cases
where reasons were provided, the AI Committee was, however, reluctant to
recognise a public interest in releasing documents relating to internal pro-
cesses, even for its own internal work processes.70
It may also be noted that, overall, a surprisingly small number of cases
were brought before the AI Appeals Board.71 In annual surveys conducted
by the Bank,72 it appears that the main reasons for respondents not filing a
second stage appeal were a general lack of confidence in the system, a lack
of knowledge of the AI Appeals Board, and the perception that an appeal
would take too much time or is too complex.
The Nature of the AI Procedure: a Quasi-Judicial Appeals Process
While it is clear that the AI Procedure is not composed of actual courts or
tribunals, it is a plausible option to place its organs in the category of
quasi-judicial bodies. In the recent past, the notion of quasi-judicial body
was often used in order to describe a large and diverse array of internation-
al organs.73 Among them, for instance, are the United Nations Human
Rights Committee,74 the Committee against Torture,75 and even the WTO
IV.
69 See cases no. IA0708 and IA1170.
70 See case no. IA0294 requesting the release of attachments to the Access to Infor-
mation Staff Handbook.
71 The fact that no appeal was introduced in the first 18-month period following the
creation of the AI Appeals Board was already a preoccupation for the World Bank.
See World Bank, ‘World Bank Policy on Access to Information – Experience in
the First 18 Months of Implementation’ (19 December 2012), available at http://d
ocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/882191468325173418/pdf/NonAsciiFileNam
e0.pdf (last visited 6 December 2018), 8, para. 23.
72 World Bank, ‘Access to Information Surveys’, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information/reports (last visited 6
December 2018).
73 See M. Tignino, Quasi-judicial bodies, in C. Brölmann & Y. Radi, Research Hand-
book on the Theory and Practice of International Law making (2016), 242-261.
74 See for example T. Burgenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in J. A.
Frowein & R. Wolfrum (eds.), 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law
(2001), 395-396.
75 A. Constantinides, Transjudicial Dialogue and Consistency in Human Rights Ju-
risprudence: A Case Study on Diplomatic Assurances against Torture, in O. K.
Fauchald & A. Nollkaemper (eds.), The Practice of International and National
Courts and the (De-) Fragmentation of International Law (2012), 269.
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Panels.76 If picking examples of quasi-judicial bodies can be simple for
well-informed legal researchers, defining in legal terms what they are is
more complicated than may appear at first glance. One of the few defini-
tions of the notion of quasi-judicial body even starts with: “quasi-judicial is
a term that is [...] not easily definable”.77
The first move of any definitional attempt is indeed to delineate the
field to be studied. The category of quasi-judicial bodies can be logically
described as composed of organs that cannot be qualified either as judicial
or as non-judicial, and which are somehow in between these two poles.
The test of “quasi-judiciality” would then be defined as being essentially a
failure of the test of judiciality.
Identifying a “test of judiciality” may be simple, given that much of the
literature on international adjudication starts by defining judicial bodies at
the international level. In order to be identified as an international judicial
body, five criteria are usually evident: 1) it must be a permanent institu-
tion,78 2) composed of international judges79 or, more generally, of inde-
pendent persons vested with adjudicatory functions,80 3) adjudicating dis-
putes between two or more entities, at least one of which is either a state or
an international organization,81 4) which is working on the basis of prede-
termined rules of procedure,82 and 5) renders legally binding decisions
based on law.83 If an international body were to “fall short on one or more
of [these] five criteria”,84 then it may be considered as a quasi-judicial or a
non-judicial one.
76 V. Hugues, The Institutional Dimension, in D. L. Bethlehem et al. (eds.), The Ox-
ford Handbook of International Trade Law (2009), 277.
77 G. W. Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence (1972), 336.
78 See C. P. R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (1999),
711-723; J. E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2006), 458.
79 Ibid.
80 See C. Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals with Regionally Restricted
and/or Specialized Jurisdiction, in Judicial Settlement of International Disputes:
International Court of Justice, Other Courts and Tribunals, Arbitration and Con-
ciliation (1987), 290-312.
81 Romano, supra note 78, 711-723; Alvarez, supra note 78, 458.
82 Ibid.
83 See S. Rials, Ouverture: l'office du juge, in La fonction de juger, Droits, (1989),
no. 9, 7. H. Ruiz Fabri, Le réglement des différends au sein de l'OMC: naissance
d'une juridiction, consolidation d'un droit, in Souveraineté étatique et marchés
internationaux à la fin du 20ème siècle. A propos de 30 ans de recherche du CRE-
DIMI – Mélanges en l'honneur de Philippe Kahn (2000), 309.
84 Alvarez, supra note 78, 459.
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Such a residual definition of an international quasi-judicial body re-
mains however relatively large in scope, and leaves several questions unan-
swered: is a body which fulfils only one of two of these criteria a quasi-ju-
dicial body or something else? Do these criteria have an identical weight in
the context of this test? Some authors have adopted quite a broad defini-
tion of quasi-judicial procedures, as:
Procedures whose rulings are either legally binding or non-binding,
and which are more or less destined for the settlement of differences
between the parties by judge-like persons through, to some extent, le-
gal process.85
One might adopt a restrictive approach and interpret each of these criteria
in a strict manner. The limit between judicial bodies and “the others” is
however not as rigid as it may seem to be. The dividing lines between in-
ternational judicial bodies and other adjudicative bodies, such as arbitral
tribunals, are somewhat vague. Cesare Romano, Karen Alter and Yuval
Shany have identified for example, two modes of adjudication by some-
how expanding the definition of international courts and tribunals:
[B]y way of judicial bodies and by way of arbitration. Judicial bodies
pre-exist the question that is to be decided. [...] Conversely, in arbitra-
tion, the adjudicators are selected by the parties after the dispute arises,
with the aim of deciding a particular case.86
Accordingly, international adjudicative bodies are different from “diplo-
matic means and even political decision-making and quasi-judicial bod-
ies”.87 The practice, however, shows that organs that are neither internation-
al courts, nor arbitral tribunals, are sometimes performing adjudicative
tasks.
At the other end of the spectrum are non-judicial bodies performing a
dispute settlement task. Legal scholars usually see the criteria of judiciality
as being the end of a process – an ideal situation to achieve – especially
when it comes to independence and impartiality. José Alvarez notes, for ex-
ample, that:
85 Y. Shigeta, International Judicial Control of Environmental Protection: Standard
Setting, Compliance Control and the Development of International Environmen-
tal Law by the International Judiciary (2010), 188.
86 C. P. R. Romano et al., Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues and
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These other quasi-judicial dispute settlers are generally distinguishable
from [non-judicial actors] because they are all characterized by some
serious attempt, primarily through rules for the type of expertise re-
quired of the dispute settlers, their method of selection, or their tenure
in office (or all three), to recognize the 'independent' status of the
third party decision-maker from the governments involved in their cre-
ation.88
In the context of the AI Procedure, it is clear that neither the AI Commit-
tee, nor the AI Appeals Board, can be seen as courts according to the crite-
ria mentioned above. It also appears more appropriate to treat the AI Com-
mittee and the AI Appeals Board separately. Having a procedure composed
of two organs of a different nature is indeed a possibility. As noted by
Megan Donaldson and Benedict Kingsbury, the “first-tier review mechan-
isms resemble administrative review mechanisms within public authori-
ties, and the second-tier review, where it exists, is often clothed in the lan-
guage of judicial and quasi-judicial process”.89 Treating both organs as
quasi-judicial has also been proposed by other authors.90 Be that as it may,
the AI Committee is clearly carrying out a dispute settlement function; the
same function carried out by the AI Appeals Board, and is thus not a non-
judicial organ.
Furthermore, differentiating a quasi-judicial nature from an administra-
tive one can be a tricky exercise, especially outside of a domestic setting.
Based on a common law version of these two notions, one could indeed
argue that the AI Committee is an administrative organ, as it carries out an
internal function based on policies of the Bank, while the AI Appeals
Board is a quasi-judicial organ, as it carries out its function in an indepen-
dent manner and as it were, in some respects, a judicial function.
It appears that quasi-judiciality is not a “one size fits all” concept. The
reality of today's dispute settlement mechanisms of international organisa-
tions may be far more complex than it appears. The time has come to take
88 Alvarez, supra note 78, 459.
89 M. Donaldson & B. Kingsbury, Power and the Public: The Nature and Effects of
Formal Transparency Policies in Global Governance Institutions, in A. Bianchi &
A. Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law (2013), 516. See also Fujita,
supra note 53, 17.
90 G. L. Burci, Inviolability of Archives (Article III Section 6 Specialized Agencies
Convention), in A. Reinisch (ed.), The Convention on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies – A Commentary (2016),
187.
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a closer look at these clusters of quasi-judicial organs, with the aim in fine
to propose a more precise taxonomy of international quasi-judicial bodies.
Concluding Remarks: Procedural Innovation, the World Bank, and the
Others
Albeit that establishing a review process for decisions denying access to in-
formation is not per se an innovation, the World Bank AI Procedure is strik-
ing for its novelty. The World Bank was the first of the international finan-
cial institutions to establish a two-stage appeals process with one stage be-
ing conducted by an external independent body. Other international finan-
cial institutions subsequently revised their own policies to include such a
procedure. The Inter-American Development Bank revised its policy in
May 2010 to include a three-member external panel to hear appeals at its
second stage.91 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) also revised its policy
in 2011 to create the Independent Appeals Panel (IAP) composed of three
transparency experts.92 Similarly, in 2012 the African Development Bank
(AfDB) established an Appeals Panel composed of three members, with
two of the members external to the Bank.93 This phenomenon of “cross-in-
stitutional normativity”94 initiated by the World Bank has been interpreted
by some authors as announcing the progressive emergence of a droit com-
mun of international financial institutions.95
V.
91 See Inter-American Development Bank, ‘Access to Information Policy’, available at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35167427 (last visited
6 December 2018).
92 ADB, ‘New Independent Appeals Panel to Strengthen ADB's Transparency’ (25
June 2012), available at http://www.adb.org/news/new-independent-appeals-panel
-strengthen-adbs-transparency (last visited 6 December 2018).
93 See AfDB, ‘Appeals Process’, available at
http://www.afdb.org/en/disclosure-and-access-to-information/appeals-process/
(last visited 6 December 2018).
94 B. Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global
Regulatory Governance, in H. Cissé et al. (eds.), The World Bank Legal Review
Volume 3: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance
(2012), 20.
95 L. Boisson de Chazournes, Partnerships, Emulation, and Coordination: Toward
the Emergence of a Droit Commun in the Field of Development Finance, in H.
Cissé et al. (eds.), The World Bank Legal Review Volume 3: International Finan-
cial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (2012), 173-187.
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This droit commun of access to information does not, however, provide
full transparency of the activities of international financial institutions.
The reluctance of these institutions to allow their independent body’s full
rein in the assessment of public interest overrides can be interpreted as a
means of retaining control over the information to be shared. The World
Bank, as any other public institution, must reach a balance between trans-
parency and confidentiality. Whilst transparency is necessary in order to
enhance legitimacy, keeping some information confidential is vital for
some of the Bank's core missions. The next step for the Bank, and the oth-
er international financial institutions, may be to go beyond the presump-
tion that independence means lack of control, and trust their independent
bodies to carry out their task, including when it comes to evaluating a
public interest to disclose, in a responsible manner.
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